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INSERT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LYRAD McCONKIE and
ILENE McCONKIE, his wife,

)
-

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

]

v.

[

FLOID C. HARTMAN and
RUTH A. HARTMAN, his wife,
Defendants and
Respondents.

Casf

)

- ]

CORRECTIONS MADE FOR BENEFIT OF LYRAD
McCONKIE L-A ILENE McCONKIE, Plaintiffs Appellants.
INSERTION TO BE MADE ON PAGE 13 AFTER
PARAGRAPH ENDING WITH QUOTATION FROM SMITH V.
EDWARDS and BEFORE PARAGRAPH BEGINNING WITH
"IT IS EVIDENT

"

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORT THE
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PROPOSITION THAT:
FRAUD APPEARING OF RECORD AND PRACTICED
ON ONE HOLDING AN EXISTING INTEREST IN LANDS
TOLLS THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
UNTIL ACTUAL DISCOVERY AND TPAT RECORD NOTICE
DOES NOT AFFORD NOTICE TO ONE HOLDING AN
EXISTING INTEREST.
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE
PROPOSITION ARE AS FOLLOWS:
STOCKLASSA V. KINNAMAN, 269 P.2 1080, at
•1081-1082, (OKL. 1928) WHEREIN THE COURT STATED:
"No duty r e s t s upon the grantee to examine
the records with reference to the title of the land
after it was purchased, and hence the public
record thereof is not such constructive notice a s
will set the statute of limitations in motion in an
action for relief on the ground of fraud.*****
In the instant c a s e , plaintiff read his deed
after it was executed and acknowledged. He saw
it delivered to the escrow holder, no doubt, for
the purpose of putting it beyond the control of
his grantor. The deed conformed to the agreement
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at that time, and plaintiff had a right to rely
on its remaining in that form. The deed*was
first received by the bank, and sent to be
recorded by it at the directions of plaintiff. The
evidence does not d i s c l o s e that the bank had any
information as to how the deed was to be drawn.
The deed was returned to the benk, and kept there
until February or March, 1924, at which time some
one who desired to purchase the mineral rights on
said land informed plaintiff of the reservation.
Plaintiff lived some distrance from Shawnee where
the cieed was kept, and never saw it until he
received the information about it containing the
reservation, and, so far as the evidence d i s c l o s e s , he had no occasion to go to inspect the
deed, until in February or March, 1924. We are
aware of the former holding of this court that
fraud is usually deemed to have been discovered
within the statute of limitations when, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have
been discovered. This merely means that one
cannot shut his eyes to obvious f a c t s , or, where
he has information or knowledge, which, if
pursued with reasonable diligence, would lead to
a discovery of the true f a c t s . "
AGAIN IN,FLOWERS V, STANLEY, 316 P.2d 840,
at 847 (OKL. 1957) THE COURT STATED:

.

"Where no duty is imposed by law on a
person to make inquiry, and where under the
circumstances a prudent man would not be put
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on inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff and he has not
availed himself of them do not debar him from
relief when thereafter he shall make actual d i s covery. In order to warrant a denial of recovery
to a person who has been defrauded, the
circumstances must have been such that inquiry
became a positive duty and failure to make the
inquiry was an omission of a d u t y . "
IN HOLLAND V. MORETON, 353 P . 2
989 at 993 (UTAH 1960) THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATED:
"The averment that the plaintiffs had notice
by the recordation of Moreton's deed is unsound.
It imparts notice only to parties who have some
duty to search the record, such a s purchasers or
others acquiring a subsequent interest in the
property."
FINALLY, IN GATES V. KANSAS FARMERS UNION
ROYALTY CO,

111 P2d 1098, AT 1103-1104 (KANSAS 1941)

THE COURT STATED:
"Appellants point out that the deed was
recorded November 24, 1930, and they s t r e s s the
contention that plaintiffs, by examining the
recorded deeds any time after they were
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recorded could have ascertained the fact that
by them a share of the mineral rights p a s s e d to
the.Flag Oil Company, hence could have learned
that fact much earlier than two years before the
action was brought* In support of this argument
they cite many of our c a s e s in which it has been
held in effect that the recording of a fraudulent deed is constructive notice of the fraud
rk

-k

-k

-k "k

Even if this contention were held to be well
taken we think it would be of no avail to
appellants in this Cdse b e c a u s e there are three
groups of fraudulent representations found by the
court to which the principle would not apply.
Each of the c a s e s cited by appellants may be
distinguished from the one before u s . None of
the c a s e s was brought by the owner of property
who had executed a deed thereto^to set it aside
b e c a u s e of the fraudulent inclusion therein of the
name of a grantee. An owner of real property is
hot bound in such a way as to start the running oJ
the statute of limitations by the constructive
notice of the recording of a deed to which his
name as grantor has been.forged (Cox v.. Watkins
149 Kan. 209, 87 P.2d 243); neither is the
recording of a deed executed by the owner of a
property constructive notice to the grantor of the
fact that there had been fraudulently included in
the deed a description of property other than that
which the grantor hod intended to convey so a s
to start the running of the statute of limitations.
"k "k "k -k

Normally an owner of the property who
executes a deed therefor has no occasion to
examine the record after the deed is recorded
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to ascertain if a fraud has been committed upon
him by the inclusion of additional real property or
an additional g r a n t e e . Certainly we think that
would be true in the a b s e n c e of any fact or
circumstances which would cause a reasonably
prudent grantor to suspect fraud practiced upon
him in that manner."
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L Y R A D M c C O N K I E and
\
I L E N E M c C O N K I E , his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, I

i

Case No.
13614

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All italics are ours and are added for emphasis.
The parties will he referred to as in the Trial Court.
"R" refers to Record and "TR." refers to Transcript
of Record.
. • /•
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
The Plaintiffs instituted action in three counts
seeking in the alternative: (1) Reformation of Deed of
Conveyance to comply with provisions of contract of
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sale; (2) Decree of Quiet Title in Plaintiffs, and (3)
Specific Performance of Uniform Real Estate Contract
based on Fraudulent Conveyance.
The Defendants asserted that they had performed
the contract and that in any event the Plaintiffs were
not entitled to relief because of laches and the Statute
of Limitations.
DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a
jury, the Honorable J . Robert Bullock, presiding. At
the conclusion of trial and argument of counsel the trial
Court rendered its Memorandum Decision holding the
Plaintiff's action was barred by reason of the Statute of
Limitations (R. 71-72). Thereafter Plaintiffs filed a
Motion for a New Trial (R. 73-90) which was denied
(R. 103).
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Plaintiffs' appeal from the Judgment of
Court denying their Motion for a New Trial
alternative that the Judgment of the Lower
reversed and Judgment ordered for Plaintiffs
New Trial be ordered.

the Trial
or in the
Court be
or that a

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs are residents of Duchesne County,
State of Utah, and reside at Altamont, Utah (TR. 9).
2
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The property which is the subject to this suit consists of three separate parcels of land near Altamont,
Utah, and comprise a total of 292 acres. (Exhibits
"Pltf. # 2 " and "Pltf. #3") (TR. 10-11).
On March 19, 1959, the Defendants entered into
a contract to sell a major portion of the subject properties to Arthello Clark, et ux, and Richard D . Titensor ,et ux, excepting an 80 acre tract (W. y% of S E
}4 of Sec. 1, T 2 So., Range 4 West, Uintah Special
Meridian), which sale also included personal property
and livestock (TR. 128). This contract did not contain any mineral reservations (Ex. "Def. no. 6") (TR.
17, 59, 60,103, 104, 106, 110).
Notwithstanding the omission of the 80 acre tract
in the original contract of March 19, 1959, the buyers
occupied and farmed the total 292 acre tract (TR.
107), and sometime later filed suit against the Hartmans, Defendants in this action, for various alleged
misrepresentations in the contract. This action is identified as Civil No. 3389 in the District Court of Duchesne
County, Utah, which action the Trial Court took
judicial notice of. The issues in this suit were still unresolved at the time Plaintiffs began negotiations to
acquire the subject properties (TR. 67, 107, 108).
On or about September 20th to 25th, 1960, the
Plaintiffs executed an "Agreement of Purchase" to
acquire the interests of the Clarks and Titensors in the
292 acres of land (Ex. "Def. no. 4") (TR. 22, 23).
This was later reduced to a more formal agreement on
or about October 31, 1960 (TR. 25) (Ex. Def. no.
3
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5"). Prior to executing any Agreement of Purchase
the Plaintiffs in this action had seen the original contract of March 19, 1959, and were aware that no mineral reservations were contained therein (TR. 60).
Following preliminary negotiations and contacts
between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, the Hartmans, Clarks, Titensors, and McConkies met at the
First Security Bank at Roosevelt ,Utah, to conclude
the matters relating to purchase of the subject properties by the Plaintiffs (TR. 63-65). Hartmans and
Clarks had not yet resolved all differences and were
engaged in a long conference at the Bank on that date
trying to resolve various issues while Mr. McConkie
was kept waiting in the lobby of the Bank (TR. 6365, 110, 111). Late in the afternoon of that date Mr.
Hartman emerged from the conference and suggested
to Mr. McConkie that a new contract be drafted between the Hartmans and McConkies which would increase the interest rate permissible for mortgages
which could be maintained on the subject properties
and would reflect the new terms and conditions of sale
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants for the land
only. Mr. McConkie acquiesced in this proposal and
the new contract was drafted and executed by the
Parties to this suit (TR. 67-69, 73-75, 114-117) (Exhibit "Pltf. #1").
During the negotiations at the Bank on November
1, 1960, the Hartmans were represented by counsel,
George Stewart of Roosevelt, Utah, and gave instructions relative to the preparation of the Uniform Real
4
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Estate Contract (Ex. "Pltf. no. 1") (TR. 115, 116,
128). At no time did Defendants ever inform Plaintiffs that mineral rights were to be reserved or that
they claimed any of the mineral interests in the land
(TR. 125-127).
The Defendant, Moid Hartman, had held a real
estate license and was conversant with Uniform Real
Estate Contracts and matters pertaining to conveyancing (TR. 128).
The McConkies, Plaintiffs in the subject action,
took possession of the subject properties in October of
1960, and occupied and possessed said premises thereafter exclusively and paid all taxes assessed thereon
(TR. 11, 12). On May 15, 1970, Plaintiffs sold a onehalf acre tract of the subject properties to their son-inlaw and on February 13, 1967, they sold 160 acres of
the subject property located in Section 32, to one Roy
Warren by Warranty Deed (TR. 11, 12, 52) (Ex.
"Def.no. 12").
On December 8, 1961, the Defendants, without
notice to or knowledge on the part of the Plaintiffs
prepared or caused to be prepared and executed two
Warranty Deeds covering the subject properties which
Deeds reserved to the Grantors various mineral rights,
which are still owned by Defendants (TR. 134-135)
(Pltfs. Ex. no. 2 and 3). On the same date that the
Deeds were prepared the Defendants caused the same
to be deposited with the First Security Bank at Roosevelt, Utah, and gave no notice thereof to the Plaintiffs.
(TR. 119, 120, 134). The Plaintiffs had no knowledge
5
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of the existence of the two Deeds which had been placed
in Escrow by the Defendants, and did not receive or
learn of the contents and reservations of said instruments until sometime within a year after 1970 with
reference to Exhibit no. 2, and within a year prior to
the trial of this case as to Exhibit no. 3 (TR. 12-16).
Plaintiffs performed under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract of November 1, 1960, until approximately
February, 1964, at which time they negotiated a new
mortgage loan with Travelers Insurance Company and
made arrangements to pay the Defendants the balance
due them for the subject properties. The Defendants
at that time instructed the First Security Bank with
reference to the unpaid balance agreed upon with the
Plaintiffs and authorized a final settlement of the
Escrow (TR. 120, 121). At no time did Defendants
ever discuss the reservation of mineral rights with the
Plaintiffs or notify the Plaintiffs of same (TR. 126,
127).
The Travelers Insurance Company had requested
that the title insurance work to be performed in conjunction with their mortgage loan be conducted by
Security Title Company (TR. 36-39). On or about
the latter part of February, 1964, a representative of
the Security Title Company by the name of Anderson
called at the home of the Plaintiffs and obtained the
signatures of the Plaintiffs on the various mortgage
loan documents required by Travelers Insurance Company (TR. 43). Thereafter the representative of the
title insurance company concluded the mortgage loan

6
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transaction for the Travelers Insurance Company (TR.
46, 47, 48) and the Defendants were paid the sums
due to them for the balance of the purchase price of
the property. The two Warranty Deeds covering the
subject properties (Pltfs. Ex. no. 2 and Pltfs. Ex. no.
3) were recorded in the Office of the County Recorder
of Duchesne County, State of Utah, on the 26th day
of February, 1964. Neither of these Deeds were returned to the Plaintiffs nor did they have any knowledge of the contents or reservations thereof until 1970
or thereafter as stated above (TR. 12-16). The Plaintiffs believed that title of the premises would be held
by the Mortgagee until the mortgage was paid in full
(TR. 50, 55). In October of 1972, the Plaintiffs
through counsel, directed a Demand Letter to the
Defendants requesting that they convey the mineral
interests which had been reserved contrary to the provisions of the contract, and this Demand was rejected.
(TR. 7 and 8). Following the rejection of the demand
the Plaintiffs instituted this suit.

ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
F R A U D A P P E A R I N G O F R E C O R D AND
P R A C T I C E D ON O N E H O L D I N G A N E X I S T ING I N T E R E S T IN LANDS TOLLS T H E
RUNNING OF T H E STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS U N T I L A C T U A L DISCOVERY.

7
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The general effect of fraud upon the running of
the statutory period in most, if not all, jurisdictions
" . . . is that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of
action from the one to whom it belongs, but the one
against whom it lies, constitutes an implied exception to
the statute of limitations, postponing the commencement of the running of the statute until discovery or
reasonable opportunity of discovery of the fact by the
owner of the cause of action." 51 Am. Jur., 2d Section
147, p. 717, see also Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93
Utah 426; 73 P.2d 1277; Also, Esponda v. Ogden State
Bank, 283 P . 729, 731 (Utah 1929), wherein the Utah
Supreme Court stated that ". . . in the case of fraud, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
fraud is discovered by the injured person." See 51 Am.
Jur. 2d, Section 147, at p. 717, wherein the rule is stated
that the statutory period begins to run ". . . from the
time when the facts were discovered or should with reasonable diligence have been discovered."
What then constitutes knowledge sufficient to put
a prudent man upon inquiry and what constitutes diligence in such an inquiry?
The jurisdictions in the United States are divided
as to their interpretation of what constitutes diligence
on the part of the defrauded party and what constitutes
sufficient facts to put him upon inquiry. A minority of
jurisdictions are of the opinion that diligence by a defrauded party in an action such as this means that a
party

8
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" . . . is chargeable with notice of that which was
of record, or which presumably he would have
discovered by a diligent investigation prosecuted
in the light of the facts of record, whether or not
under the particular circumstances reasonable
diligence would have led to an examination of
the records. When the rule intended to be laid
down by the cases is merely a rule of diligence,
propositions with reference to matters of record
add little to it, since, of course, where reasonable
diligence requires a search of public records, the
party would be chargeable with what in the exercise of such diligence is something distinct from,
and in addition to, the rule of diligence, it charges
with notice regardless of whether under the circumstances an ordinarily diligent person would
have examined the records, and does so wholly
without regard to whether or not anything had
come to the knowledge of the defrauded party of
a character to put him on inquiry. Those courts
which have at times laid down this more rigorous
rule of record notice have experienced some difficulty in adhering to it, because it is a rule of
thumb, rather than a live principle of law, and it
takes no account of the numerous forms in which
fraud may appear and its varied devices and circumstances of concealment" 37 Am. Jur. 2d,
Fraud and Deceit, Section 411, pp. 558, 599.
(Emphasis added)
The majority rule, however, although no Utah
cases have been found directly on this point, is:
". . . taken as a whole, the cases justify the conclusion that for purposes of the running of the
statute of limitations, a distinction is to be observed as between cases where the fraud was involved in a transaction wherein title or rights

9
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were acquired by the defrauded party (or would
have been acquired but for the fraud) and cases
where the fraud was practiced on an owner with
reference to property held by him. Thus, when
the ground of recovery relied on is the commission of a fraudulent act, and it appears that facts
showing or sufficiently suggesting the fraud
were of public record at the time plaintiff acquired the title or rights to which the fraud relates (or would have acquired them but for the
fraud), the ruling made, under most circumstances, is that the records are to be regarded as
constituting sufficient notice of the fraud to start
the running of the statute. But ordinarily, reasonable diligence does not require that one having no cause of suspicion shall examine the public
records to determine whether or not others have
committed acts of fraud affecting his existing
property or rights, and accordingly, as to fraud
of that character, it is usually held that the public
records alone are not such notice as will start the
running of the statute." 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud
and Deceit, Section 412, pp. 560-561 (Emphasis
added).
I t is evident from studying the decisions of the
copious jurisdictions which adhere to this latter rule that
for the period to begin running the circumstances must
be such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence
the probability that he has been defrauded, Warner v.
Republic Steel Corporation, 103 F . Supp. 998 at 1009
(1952), and in that regard it is important to note that
these same jurisdictions hold that the fact that an investigation would have revealed the falsity of a misrepresentation will not alone bar recovery by the injured party. Schaefer v. Berinstein, 4 Cal. Rptr. 236
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(1961). Some courts have even gone so far as to hold
that when fraud is involved, public records do not constitute constructive notice to a defrauded party even
though he may have had some reason to check the records. See Gross v. Needham, 7 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1961).
See also Bush v. Stone, 500 S.W.2d 885 at 891
(Texas, 1973), where the Texas court stated that:
"the mere fact that the plaintiff had the opportunity or power to investigate the fraud is not
sufficient in law to charge him with knowledge.
The defrauded party must be cognizant or aware
of facts as would have caused the ordinarily intelligent and prudent man to investigate. Where, as
here, a party is guilty of an affirmative fraudulent misrepresentation of a fact, he should not be
permitted to urge that the defrauded party could
have discovered the truth had he diligently made
an investigation."
The California courts have spoken on the issue of
constructive notice many times. In the case of Sime v.
Malowf, 212 P.2d 946 (1950), the Second District
Court of Appeals For California stated, at page 960,
that for the rule of constructive notice to run
". . . there must appear in the nature of the case
such a connection between the facts discovered
and the further facts to be discovered that the
former may be said to furnish a reasonable and
natural clue to the latter. Circumstances that are
dubious or equivocal are not sufficient to take
the place of actual notice. * * * The rule imputes
notice only of those facts that are naturally and
reasonably connected with the facts known, and
of which the known fact or facts can be said to
11
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furnish a clue. It does not impute notice of every
conceivable fact and circumstance however remote which might come to light by exhausting all
possible means of knowledge. * * * The circumstances must be such that further inquiry is an
imperative duty, and failure to make it constitutes a negligent omission."
The rationale for these cases is thus apparent, i.e.,
constructive notice constitutes notice only to those who
would have a need or interest to check the record. Once
certain facts are present, e.g., a proposed purchase of
property, a hint of fraud, etc., such circumstances as
these would cause a reasonably prudent man to search
the record. However, a person who is holding an existing interest in a piece of land, who has no reason to believe fraud has been committed, is under no obligation
to continually return to the recorder's office to check
the record on his property to make sure no fraud has
been perpetrated since he obtained his interest.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has also adopted
this reasoning. In the case of Greco v. Pullava, 444 P.2d
383, at 384 (Colo. 1968), the court stated that
"in some jurisdictions a fraudulent conveyance
of real estate is conclusively presumed to be discovered, therefore constituting notice, when the
fraudulent conveyance is filed for record. * * *
However, in Colorado the record of a Deed of
Trust or other instrument is notice only to those
persons claiming under the same chain of title
who are bound to search for it."
See also Smith v. Russell, 20 Colo. App. 554, 80 P . 474;
Fish v. East, 114 F . 2d 177 (10th Cir.). Again, to re12
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iterate, a person holding an interest is under no obligation, absent something putting him on notice, to check
on a periodic basis his chain of title. The case of Smith
v. Edwards, 82 Utah 244, 27 P.2d 264 (1932), gives
support to the rationale for the above mentioned decisions. The Court in that case at page 270, in quoting
with approval from Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 112
1130, 72 N W 838, states that
"to ascertain what constitutes a discovery of
the facts constituting the fraud reference must
be had to principles of equity. * * * Hence, in
actions in equity, the rule was that the means of
knowledge are equivalent to actual knowledge;
that is, that a knowledge of the facts would have
put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry
which, if followed up, would have resulted in a
discovery of fraud, was equivalent to actual discovery." (Emphasis Added)
It is evident from these authorities that the purpose
of the recording acts is to put prospective buyers, creditors, etc., on notice and is not to give notice to those holding existing interests in the property.
An additional problem with this issue with which
we are here concerned is whether or not the Plaintiff is
charged with notice by virtue of the notice to Security
Title Company and/or Travelers Insurance Company.
I t was shown by the evidence presented that no agency
relationship existed between either Security Title Company or Travelers, and the Plaintiff.
Does then notice to a third party known by Plaintiff but who is not an agent constitute notice to the
13
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Plaintiff? This has been answered in the negative by
Madsen v. Madsen, et al, 72 Utah 96, 269 P . 132
(1928), wherein the third party was an independent
contractor where no agency existed.
The Court therein stated and held that:
"Appellant contends that knowledge on the
part of the stray gatherer of Appellant's possession of Respondent's sheep was notice of that fact
to Respondent and regardless of all other considerations, the statute of limitations ran from
the date of such notice; giving the testimony its
most favorable interpretation in that regard we
cannot so hold. H e was a stray gatherer for both
parties to this suit, for other sheep men and his
field of activity seems to have been limited only
to the territory which he might be able to cover.
H e was an individual contractor, merely, and notice to an independent contractor does not bind
the principle."
In summarizing this point, I should like to refer to
one final, important statement in 137 A L R at 272
wherein the authors state the general rule on this point
as follows:
". . . a purchaser of property or of a claim
thereon is, ordinarily, for purposes of statutes of
limitations, charged with notice of facts of record
bearing on the truth of representations made by
the seller in reference to title or encumbrances,
since prudence usually requires a purchaser to
consult the records as to such matters at the time
of making his purchase . . .; but it is not so plain
that where one has once acquired property or
rights he must in all circumstances refer to the
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records to determine whether or not fraud,
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected,
has deprived him thereof . . ." (Emphasis added).

CONCLUSION
I t is evident from the facts that the Plaintiff, Mr.
McConkie, at no time had any reason to believe because
of any representations, actions or otherwise by the Defendants or any other party that the Defendants were
adversely or fraudulently claiming any reserved mineral interests in the subject property. H e therefore, had
no need nor occasion to inquire into the status of the interests of the various parties which were on record.
Plaintiff at no time had any indication or warning
from any source that the recorded interest was contrary
to the interest which he had negotiated, acquired and
agreed to in the contract and we therefore respectfully
submit that the statutory period should not have commenced to run until the occasion or warning did arise
which caused him to examine the record.
Respectfully submitted,
Brant H . Wall
Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants
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